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Guardian · Security audit · 2026-10-25

BuddyOS security & privacy audit

3 critical3 high5 medium6 notes

Verified live against the served site and the actual repos on 2026-10-25. Anything not directly checked is marked unverified. Canonical full text: the audit in Guardian's private repo.

Verdict

Privacy-first in intention and in the private half of the architecture. Not privacy-first in fact on the public half — and the public half is the half a stranger sees.

The private architecture is genuinely well built: 187 of 192 GitHub repos are private, no secrets are committed in the repos scanned, and the planned server fix is soundly designed. But the dashboard repo is public, so all 154 buddy homepages are world-readable — family, estate, finance, and property material included — and the registry has no privacy field at all: the rule "pages are private unless Dave says otherwise, one page at a time" is enforced nowhere. Underneath, the browser-side GitHub token is one scripting bug away from handing a stranger read/write access to every private repo. The two highest-leverage fixes are both already built or already awaiting Dave's word: his ~15-minute Firebase deploy, and his pending decision on the Neighborhood page.

Critical

C1 · Public homepages expose personal material at fleet scale

Every buddy homepage is world-readable: names, missions, and needs-attention items for 154 buddies spanning family, the estate Dave is executing (assets named, a tenant named), finances, and property. The live registry carries 109 attention items and 144 Google Doc links in one public fetch; each doc's own sharing still gates its contents, but the links are discoverable. The full source repo and its history are equally public.

Fix: until the gate ships, consider stripping the most sensitive registry content from the public build. Anything public today should be treated as permanently out — deletion does not unpublish history.

C2 · Home addresses and precise coordinates are published

The Neighborhood Buddy page publishes two residential street addresses (Fiddletown and San Jose/Lenwood) with precise latitude/longitude — verified live today. Physical-world location data for Dave's household and his sons' home, on a page whose fate (take down vs. strip) is Dave's pending decision.

Fix: decide this one first. Stripping the addresses and coordinates keeps the page's civic function; taking it down is cleaner.

C3 · A GitHub token lives in browser localStorage on a public origin

295 files carry the flow: every buddy page reads Dave's personal access token from localStorage and uses it to read and write the private repos (the Desk, Repo files, brain-dump). Any script that runs on this origin can read that key; a classic token's repo scope means read and write access to every repo — the blast radius includes rewriting or deleting every buddy's files. Dave pinned this in October as "real, not urgent." The token's exact type, scope, and expiry are unverified — they cannot be observed from Astro's machine.

Fix: deploy the already-built buddy-server and move the token server-side. Interim: Dave's 2-minute token-settings check (fine-grained, named repos, Contents read/write, with expiry).

High

H1 · The privacy principle has no representation in the system

The live registry has no privacy or visibility field on any of the 154 buddies. "Private by default, public one page at a time, inheriting parent → child" exists only as an instruction to Astro. A new buddy is public the moment its page builds — the opposite of the stated default.

Fix: add a privacy field now, default private, and have the build render private buddies as shell pages (no mission, attention, or doc links) until the real gate exists.

H2 · The fix is built but undeployed, blocked on one manual step

The buddy-server design is right — Firebase Auth allowlist for Dave only, ID-token verification, a strict GitHub path allowlist, the token in Secret Manager, deny-all Firestore client rules. It has waited since 2026-10-18 on Dave's ~15-minute deploy from his own machine. Every day of delay extends C1 and C3.

Fix: schedule the deploy. It is the highest-leverage 15 minutes in the system.

H3 · This operation runs on a standard Muse VM, where Meta can review content

Per Muse's own data-handling documentation, on a standard VM interactions may be logged and reviewed by Meta; conversations are not end-to-end encrypted; and conversations contribute to AI development unless the user opts out in Settings → Data Controls. Dave's opt-out status is unverified. Family, estate, and financial material — and the sensitive matter of a friend's legal case that Dave relays — all flow through this channel.

Fix: Dave to check the Data Controls opt-out himself. Named plainly: Meta is a trusted party to everything, by architecture, today.

Medium

M1 · No client-side encryption anywhere

Verified: no git-crypt or equivalent. GitHub, Google, Meta, and Plaid can each read what they hold; protection is access control, not secrecy from the platform. GitHub's position is the deepest — the canonical copy of nearly everything lives there. This is a trust decision to hold consciously, not necessarily a defect.

M2 · One public repo carries more than it should

fiddletown-data-admin (the events admin app) is public, including a support-email draft naming the legacy Supabase project. No service-role keys found. The events stack still runs partly on that legacy Supabase project pending the Firebase migration. Fix: make the repo private; finish the migration.

M3 · The tester promise is kept by policy, not by architecture

Testers run their own Muse and their own repos — that half of "pages are private by default" is architectural and sound. But Dave-side systems retain a private living dossier per tester (including one tester's email and a verbatim quote of her reply) plus a feedback log. "Nothing you say is quoted or shared without permission" is therefore a discipline, not a guarantee. Fix: keep the guide's wording honest about retention, and get explicit consent before any tester words are used anywhere public.

M4 · Voice synthesis sends message text to a speech service

Every spoken briefing, standup, and voice note sends its full text to the platform TTS service for synthesis. Retention on that side is unverified. Low sensitivity per message; cumulative volume is not trivial. Fix: awareness only — don't put the most sensitive material in spoken form.

M5 · Page Lockdown Phase 0 is a courtesy, not a control

Verified live: robots.txt disallows all crawlers and pages carry noindex, nofollow. Compliant crawlers stay away; a curious human is unaffected — every page still serves HTTP 200. It should never be described as the pages being "locked down."

Notes — what is genuinely sound

The good posture, for the record

The stance check, principle by principle

Recommendations, in order

A note on this page itself: publishing an audit on the public site it audits is Dave's explicit call, and this page repeats no addresses, tokens, or doc contents — it describes the surface any visitor can already see.

What I could not verify